## CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

the constitution restrictive of the power, cannot be maintained in Maryland. Harness vs. Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, 248.

- 8. Such an appropriation by law without compensation, would be in conflict with the sixth and twenty-first articles of the bill of rights, the latter of which declares "that no freeman ought to be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the laws of the land." Ib.
- To say that the legislature has such power, is to confer upon it judicial
  powers, and to confound those departments of government which the
  declaration of rights says shall be kept forever separate and distinct.
  B.
- 10. The legislature of this state has in no instance, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, omitted to provide compensation to the owner of the property taken for public uses, and such provision was made by the 15th section of the act of 1824, ch. 79, passed to confirm an act of the legislature of Virginia, incorporating the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company. The 15th and 19th sections of the charter of this company construed. Ib.
- 11. State insolvent laws, although constitutional in their action upon the rights of their own citizens, are unconstitutional and void when they affect the rights of citizens of other states. Potter vs. Kerr, 275.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

See Constitutional Law, 2.

CONSTRUCTION OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.

See Partnership and Partners, 3, 4.

## CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

- 1. Remedial laws are to be construed liberally to advance the remedy and obviate the mischief, but they are not to be so expanded as to comprehend cases altogether beyond their purview. So to apply and enlarge the law, would be judicial legislation under the guise of interpretation. Franklin vs. Franklin, 342.
- 2. The act of 1842, ch. 229, only provides a more summary and economical remedy, when cases abate either before or after decree, by the death of the parties, and does not embrace the case of a decree which has become dormant by lapse of time. Ib.
- 3. The act of 1793, ch. 43, forbids the restoring the landlord to the possession of the premises, when he is proceeding under that act, only when the title is disputed or claimed by some person, in virtue of a right or title accrued or happening since the commencement of the lease. Mousley vs. Wilson, 388.

See APPEAL, 1, 4.

Constitutional Law, 3, 10.

Corporations, 7.

DECREE DORMANT FROM LAPSE OF TIME, 1.

DEEDS VOID UNDER THE INSOLVENT LAWS, 1, 7.